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Abstract. We study the problem of counting the number of popular
matchings in a given instance. A popular matching instance consists of
agents A and houses H, where each agent ranks a subset of houses ac-
cording to their preferences. A matching is an assignment of agents to
houses. A matching M is more popular than matching M ′ if the num-
ber of agents that prefer M to M ′ is more than the number of people
that prefer M ′ to M . A matching M is called popular if there exists no
matching more popular than M . McDermid and Irving gave a poly-time
algorithm for counting the number of popular matchings when the pref-
erence lists are strictly ordered.
We first consider the case of ties in preference lists. Nasre proved that
the problem of counting the number of popular matching is #P-hard
when there are ties. We give an FPRAS for this problem.
We then consider the popular matching problem where preference lists
are strictly ordered but each house has a capacity associated with it.
We give a switching graph characterization of popular matchings in this
case. Such characterizations were studied earlier for the case of strictly
ordered preference lists (McDermid and Irving) and for preference lists
with ties (Nasre). We use our characterization to prove that counting
popular matchings in capacitated case is #P-hard.
1 Introduction
A popular matching problem instance I comprises a set A of agents and a set H
of houses. Each agent a in A ranks (numbers) a subset of houses in H (lower
rank specify higher preference). The ordered list of houses ranked by a ∈ A is
called a’s preference list. For an agent a, let Ea be the set of pairs (a, h) such that
the house h appears on a’s preference list. Define E = ∪a∈AEa. The problem
instance I is then represented by a bipartite graph G = (A∪H, E). A matching
M of I is a matching of the bipartite graph G. We useM(a) to denote the house
assigned to agent a in M and M(h) to denote the agent that is assigned house h
inM . An agent prefers a matchingM to a matchingM ′ if (i) a is matched inM
and unmatched in M ′, or (ii) a is matched in both M and M ′ but a prefers the
house M(a) to M ′(a). Let φ(M,M ′) denote the number of agents that prefer M
to M ′. We sayM is more popular than M ′ if φ(M,M ′) > φ(M ′,M), and denote
it by M ≻ M ′. A matching M is called popular if there exists no matching M ′
such that M ′ ≻M .
The popular matching problem was introduced in [5] as a variation of the
stable marriage problem [4]. The idea of popular matching has been studied
extensively in various settings in recent times [1,14,12,10,8,11,13], mostly in the
context where only one side has preference of the other side but the other side
has no preference at all. We will also focus on this setting. Much of the earlier
work focuses on finding efficient algorithms to output a popular matching, if one
exists.
The problem of counting the number of “solutions” to a combinatorial ques-
tion falls into the complexity class #P. An area of interest that has recently gath-
ered a certain amount of attention is the problem of counting stable matchings
in graphs. The Gale-Shapely algorithm [4] gives a simple and efficient algorithm
to output a stable matching, but counting them was proved to be #P-hard in
[6]. Bhatnagar, Greenberg and Randall [2] showed that the random walks on the
stable marriage lattice are slowly mixing, even in very restricted versions of the
problem. [3] gives further evidence towards the conjecture that there may not
exist an FPRAS at all for this problem.
Our motivation for this study is largely due to the similarity of structures be-
tween stable matchings and popular matchings (although no direct relationship
is known). The interest is further fueled by the existence of a linear time algo-
rithm to exactly count the number of popular matchings in the standard setting
[12]. We look at generalizations of the standard version - preferences with ties
and houses with capacities. In the case where preferences could have ties, it is
already known that the counting version is #P-hard [13]. We give an FPRAS
for this problem. In the case where houses have capacities, we prove that the
counting version is #P-hard. While the FPRAS for the case of ties is achieved
via a reduction to a well known algorithm, the #P-hardness for the capacitated
case is involving, making it the more interesting setting of the problem.
We now formally describe the different variants of the popular matching prob-
lem (borrowing the notation from [14]) and also describe our results alongside.
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House Allocation problem (HA) These are the instances G = (A ∪ H, E)
where the preference list of each agent a ∈ A is a linear order. Let n = |A| +
|H| and m = |E|. In [1], Abraham et al. give a complete characterization of
popular matchings in an HA instance, using which they give an O(m+ n) time
algorithm to check if the instance admits a popular matching and to obtain the
largest such matching, if one exists. The question of counting popular matchings
was first addressed in [12], where McDermid et al. give a new characterization
by introducing a powerful structure called the switching graph of an instance.
The switching graph encodes all the popular matchings via switching paths and
switching cycles. Using this structure, they give a linear time algorithm to count
the number of popular matchings.
House Allocation problem with Ties (HAT) An instance G = (A∪H, E)
of HAT can have applicants whose preference list contains ties. For example,
the preference list of an agent could be [h3, (h1, h4), h2], meaning, house h3 gets
rank 1, houses h1 and h4 get a tied rank 2 and house h2 gets the rank 3. A
characterization for popular matchings in HAT was given in [1]. They use their
characterization to give an O(
√
nm) time algorithm to solve the maximum car-
dinality popular matching problem. We outline their characterization briefly in
Section 2 where we consider the problem of counting popular matchings in HAT.
In [13], Nasre gives a proof of #P-hardness of this problem. We give an FPRAS
for this problem by reducing it to the problem of counting perfect matchings in
a bipartite graph.
Capacitated House Allocation problem (CHA) A popular matching in-
stance in CHA has a capacity ci associated with each house hi ∈ H, allowing at
most ci agents to be matched to house hi. The preference list of each agent is
strictly ordered. A characterization for popular matchings in CHA was given in
[14], along with an algorithm to find the largest popular matching (if one exists)
in time O(
√
Cn1 +m), where n1 = |A|, m = |E| and C is the total capacity of
the houses. In Section 3, we consider the problem counting popular matchings
in CHA. We give a switching graph characterization of popular matchings in
CHA. This is similar to the switching graph characterization for HA in [12]. Our
construction is also motivated from [13], which gives a switching graph charac-
terization of HAT. We use our characterization to prove that it is #P-Complete
to compute the number of popular matchings in CHA.
Remark: A natural reduction exists from a CHA instance G = (A ∪ H, E) to
an HAT instance. The reduction is as follows. Treat each house hi ∈ H with
capacity c as c different houses h1i , . . . , h
c
i of unit capacity, which are always
tied together and appear together wherever hi appears in any agent’s preference
list. Let the HAT instance thus obtained be G′. It is clear that every popular
matching of G is a popular matching of G′. Hence, for example, an algorithm
which finds a maximum cardinality popular matching for HAT can be used to
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find a maximum cardinality popular matching for the CHA instance G. In the
context of counting, it is important to note that one popular matching of G may
translate to many popular matchings in G′. It is not clear if there is a useful map
between these two sets that may help in obtaining either hardness or algorithmic
results for counting problems.
2 Counting in House Allocation problem with Ties
In this section we consider the problem of counting the number of popular match-
ings in House Allocation problem with Ties (HAT). We first describe the char-
acterization given in [1] here using similar notations. Let G = (A ∪ H, E) be
an HAT instance. For any agent a ∈ A, let f(a) define the set of first choices
of a. For any house h ∈ H, define f(h) := {a ∈ A, f(a) = h}. A house h for
which f(h) 6= φ is called an f -house. To simplify the definitions, we add a unique
last-resort house l(a) with lowest priority for each agent a ∈ A. This forces every
popular matching to be an applicant complete matching.
Definition 1. The first choice graph of G is defined to be G1 = (A∪H, E1),
where E1 is the set of all rank one edges.
Lemma 1. If M is a popular matching of G, then M∩E1 is a maximum match-
ing of G1.
Let M1 be any maximum matching of G1. The matching M1 can be used to
identify the houses h that are always matched to an agent in the set f(h). In
this direction, we observe that M1 defines a partition of the vertices A∪H into
three disjoint sets - even, odd and unreachable: a vertex is even (resp. odd) if
there is an even (resp. odd) length alternating path from an unmatched vertex
(with respect to M1) to v; a vertex v is unreachable if there is no alternating
path from an unmatched vertex to v. Denote the sets even, odd and unreachable
by E , Ø and U respectively. The following is a well-known theorem in matching
theory [9].
Lemma 2 (Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition). Let G1 and M1 define the
partition E, Ø and U as above. Then,
(a) The sets E, Ø and U are pairwise disjoint, and every maximum matching
in G1 partitions the vertices of G1 into the same partition of even, odd and
unreachable vertices.
(b) In any maximum matching of G1, every vertex in U is matched with another
vertex in U , and every vertex in Ø is matched with some vertex in E. No
maximum matching contains an edge between a vertex in Ø and a vertex in
Ø ∪ U . The size of a maximum matching is |Ø|+ |U|/2.
(c) G1 contains no edge connecting a vertex in E with a vertex in U .
We show the decomposition of G1 in Figure 1, where we look at the bi-
partitions of U , Ø, and E . Since G1 only contained edges resulting from first-
choices, every house in Ur and Ør is an f -house. From Lemma 2, each such house
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Ul Ur
...
Øl
Er
...
El
Ør
...
Fig. 1. Gallai-Edmonds decomposition of the first-choice graph of G
h ∈ Ur ∪ Ør is matched with an agent in f(h) in every maximum matching of
G1, and correspondingly in every popular matching of G (Lemma 1).
For each agent a, define s(a) to be a’s most preferred house(s) in Er. Note
that s(a) always exists after the inclusion of last-resort houses l(a). The following
is proved in [1].
Lemma 3. A matching M is popular in G if and only if
1. M ∩ E1 is a maximum matching of G1, and
2. for each applicant a, M(a) ∈ f(a) ∪ s(a).
The following hardness result is from [13].
Theorem 1. Counting the number of popular matchings in HAT is #P-hard.
We now give an FPRAS for counting the number of popular matchings in
the case of ties. As before, let G = (A∪H, E) be our HAT instance. We assume
that that G admits at least one popular matching (this can be tested using
the characterization). We reduce our problem to the problem of counting perfect
matchings in a bipartite graph. We start with the first-choice graph G1 of G, and
perform a Gallai-Edmonds decomposition of G1 using any maximum matching
of G1. In order to get a perfect matching instance, we extend the structure
obtained from Gallai-Edmonds decomposition described in Figure 1. Let F be
the set of f -houses and S be the set of s-houses. We make use of the following
observations in the decomposition.
— Every agent in Ul and Øl gets one of their first-choice houses in every popular
matching.
— Er can be further partitioned into the following sets:
– Efr := {h ∈ F ∩ S, h ∈ Er},
– Esr := {h ∈ F ∩ S, h ∈ Er},
– Ef/sr := {h ∈ F ∩ S, h ∈ Er}, and
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– E⋆r := {h /∈ F ∪ S, h ∈ Er}.
— Ol can only match with houses in Efr ∪ Ef/sr in every popular matching.
These observations are described in Figure 2(a).
Next, we observe that every agent in El that is already not matched to a house
in Ør, must match to a house in Esr ∪Ef/sr . We facilitate this by adding all edges
(a, s(a)) for each agent in El. Finally, we add a set of dummy agent vertices D on
the left side to balance the bipartition. The size of D is |A| − (|H| − |E⋆r |). This
difference is non-negative as long as the preference-lists of agents are complete.
We make the bipartition (D, Efr ∪Ef/sr ∪Esr ) a complete bipartite graph by adding
the appropriate edges. This allows us to move from one popular matching to
another by switching between first and second-choices and, among second choices
of agents. Finally, we remove set E⋆r from the right side. The new structure is
described in Figure 2(b). Denote the new graph by G′.
A H
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Fig. 2(a)
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D
...
Fig. 2(b)
Fig. 2. Reduction to a perfect-matching instance by extending the Gallai-Edmonds
decomposition of G1.
Lemma 4. The number of popular matchings in G is |D|! times the number of
perfect matchings in G′.
Proof. Consider a perfect matching M of G′. Let the matching M ′ be obtained
by removing fromM all the edges coming out of the set D. Observe thatM ′∩E1
is a maximum matching of G1. This is because the sets Ul, Ol and Ør are always
matched in M ′ (or else M would not be a perfect matching of G′) and that the
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size of a maximum matching in G1 is (|Ul| + |Øl| + |Ør|) by Lemma 2. Also,
each agent in A is matched to either a house in F or in S by the construction
of graph G′. Using Lemma 3, we conclude that M is a popular matching of G.
Finally, observe that every popular matching in M in G can be augmented to
a perfect matching of G′ by adding exactly |D| edges. This follows again from
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. ⊓⊔
We now make use of the following result of Jerrum et al. from [7].
Lemma 5. There exists an FPRAS for the problem of counting number of per-
fect matchings a bipartite graph.
From Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, we have the following.
Theorem 2. There exists an FPRAS for counting the number of popular match-
ings in the House Allocation problem with Ties.
3 Counting in Capacitated House Allocation problem
In this section, we consider the structure of popular matchings in Capacitated
House Allocation problem (CHA). A CHA instance I consists of agents A and
houses H. Let |A| = n and |H| = m. Let c : H → Z>0 be the capacity function
for houses. Each agent orders a subset of the houses in a strict order creating
its preference list. The preference list of ai ∈ A defines a set of edges Ei from
ai to houses in H. Define E = ∪i∈[n]Ei. The problem instance I can then be
represented by a bipartite graph G = (A ∪H, E).
For the instance I, a matching M is a subset of E such that each agent
appears in at most one edge inM and each house h appears in at most c(h) edges
in M . The definitions of more popular than relationship between two matchings
and popular matching is same as described earlier in Section 1.
We now outline a characterization of popular matchings in CHA from [14].
As before, denote by f(a) the first choice of an agent a ∈ A. A house which is
the first choice of at least one agent is called an f -house. For each house h ∈ H,
define f(h) = {a ∈ A, f(a) = h}. For each agent a ∈ A, we add a unique
last-resort house l(a) with least priority and capacity 1.
Lemma 6. If M is a popular matching then for each f -house h, |M(h)∩f(h)| =
min{c(h), |f(h)|}.
For each agent a ∈ A, define s(a) to be the highest ranked house h on a’s
preference list such that one of the following is true:
– h is not an f -house, or,
– h is an f -house but h 6= f(a) and |f(h)| < c(h).
Notice that s(a) always exists after the inclusion of last-resort houses l(a). The
following lemma gives the characterization of popular matchings in G.
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Lemma 7. A matching M is popular if and only if
1. for every f -house h ∈ H,
– if |f(h)| ≤ c(h), then every agent in f(h) is matched to the house h,
– else, house h is matched to exactly c(h) agents, all belonging to f(h),
2. M is an agent complete matching such that for each agent a ∈ A, M(a) ∈
{f(a), s(a)}.
3.1 Switching Graph Characterization of CHA
We now give a switching graph characterization of popular matchings for in-
stances from this class. Our results are motivated from similar characterizations
for HA in [12] and for HAT in [13]. A switching graph for an instance allows us
to move from one popular matching to another by making well defined walks on
the switching graph.
Consider a popular matching M of an instance G of CHA. The switching
graph of G with respect to M is a directed weighted graph GM = (H, EM ), with
the edge set EM defined as follows. For every agent a ∈ A,
– add a directed edge from M(a) to {f(a), s(a)} \M(a),
– ifM(a) = f(a), assign a weight of −1 on this edge, otherwise assign a weight
of +1.
Associated with the switching graph GM , we have an unsaturation degree func-
tion uM : H → Z≥0, defined uM (h) = c(h) − |M(h)|. A vertex h is called
saturated if its unsaturation degree is 0, i.e. uM (h) = 0. If uM (h) > 0, h is
called unsaturated. We make use of the following terminology in the foregoing
discussion. We now describe some useful properties of the switching graph GM .
⊲ Property 1: Each vertex h can have out-degree at most c(h).
Proof. Each edge is from a matched house to an unmatched house and since
the house h has a maximum capacity c(h), it can only get matched to at
most c(h) agents. ⊓⊔
⊲ Property 2: Let M and M ′ be two different popular matchings in G and
let GM and GM ′ denote the switching graphs respectively. For any vertex
house h, the number of −1 outgoing edges from h is invariant across GM
and GM ′ . The number of +1 incoming edges on h is also invariant across
GM and GM ′ .
Proof. From Lemma 6, in any popular matching, each f -house h is matched
to exactly min{|f(h)|, c(h)} agents and this is also the number of outgoing
edges with weight −1. A similar argument can be made for +1 weighted
incoming edges. ⊓⊔
⊲ Property 3: No +1 weighted edge can end at an unsaturated vertex.
Proof. If a +1 weighted edge is incident on a vertex h, this means that
the house h is an f -house for some agent a that is still not matched to it
in M . But if h is unsaturated then it still has some unused capacity. The
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matching M ′ obtained by just promoting a to h is popular than M , which
is a contradiction. ⊓⊔
⊲ Property 4: There can be no incoming −1 weighted edge on a saturated
vertex if all its outgoing edges have weight −1.
Proof. A −1 weighted edge on a vertex h implies that the house h is an s-
house for some agent a. But if h is saturated with all outgoing edges having
a weight of −1, then all the capacity of h has been used up by agents who
had h as their first choice. But by definition, h can not be an s-house for
any other agent. ⊓⊔
⊲ Property 5: For a given vertex h, if there exists at least one +1 weighted
incoming edge, then all outgoing edges are of weight −1 and there can be
no −1 weighted incoming edge on h.
Proof. Let agent a correspond to any +1 weighted incoming edge. Suppose
h has an outgoing +1 edge ending at a vertex h′ and agent a′ corresponds to
this edge. We can promote agents a and a′ to their first choices and demote
any agent which is assigned house h′. This leads to a matching popular than
M . Hence all outgoing edges from h must be of weight −1. Further, Property
3 and Property 4 together imply that there can be no incoming edge on h
of weight −1. ⊓⊔
Switching Moves We now describe the operation on the switching graph which
takes us from one popular matching to another. We make use of the following ter-
minology with reference to the switching graph GM . Note that the term “path”
(“cycle”) implies a “directed path” (“directed cycle”). A “+1 edge”(“−1 edge”)
means an “edge with weight +1” (“edge with weight −1”).
– A path is called an alternating path if it starts with a +1 edge, ends at a −1
edge and alternates between +1 and −1 edges.
– A switching path is an alternating path that ends at an unsaturated vertex.
– A switching cycle is an even length cycle of alternating −1 and +1 weighted
edges.
– A switching set is a union of edge-disjoint switching cycles and switching
paths, such that at most k switching paths end a vertex of unsaturation
degree k.
– A switching move is an operation on GM by a switching set S in which, for
every edge e in S, we reversed the direction of e and flip the weight of e
(+1↔ −1).
Observe that every valid switching graph inherently implies a matching (in the
context of CHA) of G.
Let GM = (H, EM ) and GM ′ = (H, EM ′) be the switching graphs associated
with popular matchingsM andM ′ of the CHA instance G = (A∪H, E). Observe
that the underlying undirected graph of GM and GM ′ are same. We have the
following.
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Theorem 3. Let S be the set of edges in GM that get reversed in GM ′ . Then,
S is a switching set for GM .
We prove this algorithmically in stages.
Lemma 8. Every directed cycle in S is a switching cycle of GM .
Proof. Let C be any cycle in S. From Property 5 of switching graphs, we know
that no vertex in C can have an incoming edge and an outgoing edge of same
weight +1. Similarly, since S is the set of edges in GM which have opposite
directions and opposite weights in GM ′ , we observe that S can not contain any
vertex with incoming and outgoing edges both having weight −1 (again from
Property 5). This forces the weights of cycle C to alternate between +1 and −1.
Moreover, this alternation forces the cycle to be of even length.
At this stage we apply the following algorithm to the set S.
Reduction(S):
1. while (there exists a switching cycle C in S):
let S := S \ C
2. while (S is non-empty):
(a) find a longest path P in S which alternates between weights +1 and −1
(b) let S := S \ P
At the end of every iteration of the while loop in Step 1, Lemma 8 still holds
true. We now prove a very crucial invariant of the while loop in Step 2.
Lemma 9. In every iteration of the while loop in Step 2 of the algorithm
Reduction, the longest path in step 2(a) is a switching path for GM .
Proof. Let us denote the stages of the run of algorithm Reduction by t. Initially,
at t = 0, before any of the while loops run, S is exactly the difference of edges
in EM and E
′
M . Let the while loop in Step 1 runs t1 times and the while loop
in Step 2 runs t2 times.
Let the current stage be t = t1+ i. Let P be the maximal path in step 2(a) at
this stage. We show that P starts with an edge of weight +1. For contradiction,
let (hi, hj) be an edge of weight −1 and that this is the first edge of path P . Let
aij be the agent associated with the edge (hi, hj).
The Property 5 of switching sets precludes any incoming edge of weight −1
on the vertex hi. Hence, no switching path could have ended at hi at any stage
t < t1 + i. Similarly, no switching cycle with an incoming edge −1 was incident
on hi at an earlier stage.
Let us assume that there were r cycles that were incident at hi at t = 0. At
stage t = t1 + i, let the number of outgoing −1 edges be m. Hence at t = 0,
hi had r incoming +1 edges and r +m outgoing −1 edges. But this would also
imply that at t = 0, hi had r +m incoming +1 edges in GM ′ . This contradicts
Property 2, requiring the number of incoming +1 edges to be constant in the
switching graphs corresponding to different popular matchings.
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A similar argument can be made for the fact that the path P can only end
at an edge with weight −1 and that P ends at an unsaturated vertex.
The following theorem establishes the characterization for popular matchings in
CHA.
Theorem 4. If GM is the switching graph of the CHA instance G with respect
to a popular matching M , then
(i) every switching move on GM generates another popular matching, and
(ii) every popular matching of G can be generated by a switching move on M .
Proof.
(i) We verify that the new matching generated by applying a switching move on
GM satisfies the characterization in Lemma 7. Call the new switching graph
GM ′ and the associated matching M
′. First, observe that M ′ is indeed an
agent complete matching since GM ′ still has a directed edge for each agent
in A. Next, each agent a is still matched to f(a) or s(a) as the switching
move either reverses an edge of GM or leaves it as it is. Finally, for each
house h, f(h) ⊆ M ′(h) if |f(h)| < c(h) and |M ′(h)| = c(h) with M ′(h) ⊆
f(h) otherwise. This is true because |M ′(h)| = |M(h)|, by the definition of
switching moves.
(ii) This is implied by Theorem 3.
3.2 Hardness of Counting
In this section we prove the #P-hardness of counting popular matchings in CHA.
We reduce the problem of counting the number of matchings in a bipartite graph
to our problem.
Let G = (A ∪ B,E) be a bipartite matching instance in which we want to
count the number of matchings. From G we create a CHA instance I such that
the number of popular matchings of I is same as the number of matchings of G.
Observe that a description of a switching graph gives the following informa-
tion about its instance:
– the set of agents A,
– for each agent a ∈ A, it gives f(a) and s(a), and
– for each s-house or f -house h, the unsaturation degree gives the capacity
c(h).
Using this information, we can create the description of the instance I so that it
meets our requirement. For simplicity, we assume G to be connected (as isolated
vertices do not affect the count). We orient all the edges of G from A to B and
call the directed graph G′ = (A ∪ B,E′). Using G′, we construct a graph S,
which will be the switching graph.
Let |A| = n1, |B| = n2 and |E′| = m. S is constructed by augmenting G′.
We keep all the vertices and edges of G′ in S and assign each edge a weight of
−1. Further, for each vertex u ∈ A, add a copy u′ and add a directed edge from
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u′ to u, and assign a weight of +1 to the edge. Call the new set of vertices A′.
The sets A′ and B contain s-houses and the set A contains f -houses. We label
every vertex in A′ and A as saturated and for each vertex v in B, we label v
as unsaturated with unsaturation degree 1. Hence, the switching graph S has
2n1 + n2 vertices and n1 +m edges.
The CHA instance I corresponding to the switching graph S has 2n1 + n2
houses and n1 +m agents. Each agent has a preference list of length 2 that is
naturally defined by the weight of edges in S.
Let the popular matching represented by S be Mφ. This corresponds to the
empty matching of G. Every non-empty matching of G can be obtained by a
switching move on S. We make this more explicit in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. The number of matchings in G is same as the number of popular
matchings in I.
Proof. We prove this by showing that each matching in G corresponds to a
unique set of edge disjoint switching paths in the switching graph S of I.
Consider a matching M of G and let (u, v) ∈ M . We look at the length 2
directed path in S that is obtained by extending (u, v) in the reverse direction:
u′ → u → v with u′ ∈ A′. It’s easy to see that this is a switching path for I.
Moreover, the set of switching paths obtained from any matching of G forms
a valid switching set (as every pair of such paths arising from a matching are
always edge disjoint).
For the converse, observe that S can only have switching paths of length 2
and it has no switching cycles. An edge disjoint set of such paths corresponds
to a matching of G. By the definition of S, it’s easy to see every matching in M
can be obtained by a switching set of S.
Conclusions and Acknowledgement: Our main contribution is the #-P hardness
and an FPRAS for the Capacitated House Allocation problem. We believe that
the switching graph characterization may be useful in other problems in the
setting of CHA.
We thank Meghana Nasre for fruitful discussions. We also thank anonymous
reviewers for their input.
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